Volume 4, No. 8 August 2026
p-ISSN 3032-3037 | e-ISSN 3031-5786

ADVANCES IN SOCIAL HUMANITIES RESEARCH

Evaluation of Collaborative Governance in Inflation Control During Religious Holidays

Ngurah Pradnya Maha Suputra*, Agus Fredy Maradona
Universitas Pendidikan Nasional, Indonesia
Email: ngurahp53@gmail.com*, agusfredym@undiknas.ac.id

Keywords:
collaborative governance; regional inflation control; TPID; religious holidays; public policy evaluation

Abstract

This study evaluates the collaborative governance practiced by the Regional Inflation Control Team (Tim Pengendalian Inflasi Daerah [TPID]) of Jembrana Regency during HBK periods, using the collaborative governance framework of Ansell and Gash (2008) in combination with William Dunn's public policy evaluation criteria. A descriptive qualitative method was employed, with data collected through in-depth interviews with sixteen purposively selected informants, nonparticipant observation, and document analysis, and analyzed using the interactive model of Miles and Huberman. The results show that TPID Jembrana has comprehensively implemented collaborative governance through the 4K strategy, comprising price affordability, supply availability, smooth distribution, and effective communication. Resource asymmetries among regional agencies were transformed into symbiotic interdependence rather than sectoral domination; the institutional design was structured inclusively with clear ground rules; and facilitative leadership successfully mediated intersectoral conflicts while empowering weaker actors, such as small-scale traders. When evaluated against Dunn's criteria, the policy was found to be effective, efficient, equitable, and responsive, although its adequacy and appropriateness in achieving long-term food self-sufficiency remain only partially fulfilled. The main inhibiting factors include stagnation in budget absorption following the 2023 regional leadership transition, external climate shocks associated with El Niño, the reduction in paddy-field area, and pest infestations. The collaboration measurably increased the local production of rice, shallots, chili peppers, and livestock products, thereby providing a buffer against demand-pull inflation and successfully preventing panic buying during religious holidays. This study contributes to the collaborative governance literature by demonstrating that resource asymmetry can serve as a catalyst for, rather than an obstacle to, effective multi-actor inflation control at the district level.

INTRODUCTION

Regional inflation is a strategic issue in public administration because it is directly related to price stability, community purchasing power, and the effectiveness of policy coordination at the local level (Tassinari et al., 2024). During National Religious Holidays (Hari Besar Keagamaan [HBK]), inflationary pressures tend to increase due to surging demand, distribution disruptions, and changes in community consumption behavior. Therefore, inflation control during these periods requires anticipatory, coordinated, and responsive governance (B. P. S. K. Jembrana, 2026).

(Ascari & Fosso, 2024) found that globalization plays a significant role in shaping a country's long-term inflation structure, while global inflation is also influenced by fluctuations in international commodity prices, exchange-rate dynamics, and the formation of inflation expectations. (Blinder et al., 2024) argue that effective central bank communication with the public plays a crucial role in shaping inflation expectations, which, in turn, influence consumption and investment behavior. In Indonesia, the inflation rate has remained relatively low compared with those of major economies; in September 2024, it stood at 1.84 percent, the lowest level since September 2023, while by the first quarter of 2025, inflation in Bali Province reached 2.41 percent, indicating a relatively stable yet seasonally volatile trend. As the world's fifteenth-largest country, with approximately 17,500 islands, 38 provinces, and 514 regencies and cities, Indonesia faces distinct challenges in stabilizing inflation because each region differs in agricultural capacity, logistics infrastructure, and demand structure, thereby requiring locally responsive governance mechanisms (Bryson et al., 2006).

Blinder and Reis (2022) further show that inflation does not affect all income groups equally; low-income households with low substitution elasticity experience disproportionately greater welfare losses when exposed to inflation shocks, making inflation control not merely an economic issue but also a social and humanitarian concern. Evidence from their study indicates that welfare losses and declines in purchasing power decrease steadily from the lowest to the highest income quintile, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Welfare Loss and Purchasing-Power Decline from an Inflation Shock by Income Quintile

Income Quintile	Welfare Loss (%)	Purchasing-Power Decline (%)
Bottom 20%	4.80	7.25
Second Quintile (Q2)	3.40	5.50
Middle 20%	1.75	3.15
Fourth Quintile (Q4)	1.00	1.60
Top 20%	0.45	0.75

Source: (Blinder & Reis, 2022), "A Pound of Flesh," Journal of Monetary Economics, data reprocessed by the authors.

Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia implicitly mandates that the state develop a social security system for all citizens and empower vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in a manner consistent with human dignity. To realize this mandate, the government has issued various regulations related to inflation control, such as Minister of Finance Regulation No. 67 of 2023, Article 10(1), which stipulates that current-year fiscal performance incentives are used to finance activities supporting inflation control, stunting reduction, investment growth, and poverty alleviation. (Indonesia, 2023), in its publication on supply-side policies to address rising inflation, emphasizes that inflation control requires an integrated approach combining monetary and supply-side policies, particularly to address inflationary pressures arising from disruptions in food and energy supplies. This policy direction reflects the government's commitment to addressing inflation holistically and implicitly acknowledges that effective inflation control requires strong collaboration and coordination among institutions and stakeholders at both the central and regional levels.

Empirical evidence shows that the decentralization of inflation-control policy from the central government to the regional level has been accompanied by significant variation in regional inflation rates, occurring alongside broader institutional transformations in Indonesia's governance system, including the implementation of regional autonomy following the 1998 Reform Era. As an important pillar of national economic stability, inflation control has become a central focus of Indonesia's monetary and fiscal policies. Law No. 3 of 2004 concerning Bank Indonesia stipulates that Bank Indonesia, as the central bank, plays a strategic role in monetary policy by maintaining rupiah stability and supporting sustainable economic growth through inflation control. In this context, (Coibion et al., 2025) found that inflation expectations that are not anchored to the official inflation target play a highly significant role in (Purwono et al., 2020) inflation dynamics during both inflationary surges and deflationary episodes, and that effective central bank communication can help re-anchor inflation expectations at sustainable levels. This implies that inflation control requires not only technical instruments but also effective communication mechanisms between monetary institutions and local communities and stakeholders (P. K. Jembrana, 2024a, 2024b, 2026a, 2026b).

Inflation cannot be effectively controlled by a single institution but instead requires holistic and integrated multi-actor collaboration and synergy. (Ansell & Gash, 2008), in their seminal work "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," define collaborative governance as a collective decision-making process involving one or more government agencies and nongovernmental stakeholders working together in a formal, consensus-oriented forum to formulate or implement public policy (McGuire, 2006). Their model emphasizes the importance of face-to-face dialogue, trust building, commitment to the process, and shared understanding as critical factors influencing the success of collaboration. This theoretical framework is relevant for evaluating the extent to which the collaborative governance practiced by the Regional Inflation Control Team (Tim Pengendalian Inflasi Daerah [TPID]) of Jembrana Regency aligns with, or diverges from, the principles of collaborative governance in practice (Emerson et al., 2012).

Indonesia's religious diversity creates a cycle of National Religious Holidays (Hari Besar Keagamaan [HBK]) that consistently generates significant seasonal inflationary patterns. (Emerson et al., 2012; Gupta & Dabas, 2018), in their study of seasonal food inflation patterns in India, show that during religious observances, communities experience sharp increases in demand for staple foods and ceremonial necessities, while anticipatory price expectations may become self-fulfilling as traders and distributors preemptively raise prices. Supply-side factors, such as distribution bottlenecks, hoarding by certain actors, and excessive price markups by traders, further contribute to sharp and often difficult-to-control price increases, demonstrating that local socioeconomic and cultural dynamics associated with HBK consumption patterns materially affect the effectiveness of inflation-control policies.

In Bali, monthly inflation volatility throughout 2025 was considerable (Bali, 2025), with the food, beverage, and tobacco group fluctuating between inflation and deflation from month to month, as shown in Table 2. The group recorded its highest month-to-month inflation rate of 3.82 percent in January 2025, shortly after an electricity-discount period ended and farm-gate price adjustments took effect, while the deepest deflation, at -1.92 percent, occurred in May 2025, reflecting a strong supply recovery following the planting season. This volatility persisted through November 2025, when deflation reached -0.32 percent, before inflation resurged to 2.11 percent in December 2025, coinciding with the year-end holiday season and rising demand.

Table 2. Monthly Inflation of the Food, Beverage, and Tobacco Group in Bali, 2025

Month	Inflation (%)	Month	Inflation (%)
January	3.82	July	0.56
February	-0.91	August	-1.46
March	1.16	September	-0.32
April	-0.37	October	0.31
May	-1.92	November	0.75
June	1.20	December	2.11

Source: BPS Provinsi Bali (2025), data reprocessed by the authors.

Inflation dynamics across regencies and cities within Bali Province also exhibit complex and heterogeneous patterns. Data from BPS Provinsi Bali for December 2024 show that Bali's average year-on-year inflation rate was 2.34 percent, remaining within Bank Indonesia's inflation target range of 2.5% ± 1.0%, although significant disparities were observed across regions. Denpasar recorded the highest inflation rate at 2.69 percent, while Singaraja recorded the lowest at 1.93 percent. A year later, in December 2025, Bali's inflation rate increased to 2.91 percent, its highest level in three years, accompanied by a further widening of regional disparities, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Regional Inflation Disparity across Bali by Regency/City, December 2025

Region	Month-to-Month (%)	Year-to-Date (%)	Year-on-Year (%)
Denpasar City	0.38	3.45	3.45
Tabanan Regency	1.02	2.70	2.70
Singaraja (Buleleng)	0.69	2.51	2.51
Badung Regency	1.12	2.37	2.37

Source: BPS Provinsi Bali (2025), data reprocessed by the authors.

The increase in Bali's inflation has been accompanied by greater volatility in staple food commodity prices, particularly shallots (up to 39.35 percent in 2025), bird's-eye chili (87.46 percent), tomatoes (96.39 percent), and broiler chicken meat (33.16 percent). Bali's seasonal inflation pattern tends to peak in March, July, and December, indicating a strong dependence on agricultural production cycles and seasonal tourism demand. Within this context, Jembrana Regency, an agrarian-dominated economy located at the westernmost boundary of the province, faces a particularly complex inflation-control challenge. Inflationary pressures are largely food-driven, as the food sector accounts for 40.93 percent of household expenditure, making Jembrana highly vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations that frequently occur during specific periods. This phenomenon raises questions regarding how the collaborative governance of TPID Jembrana has responded to these heightened inflationary pressures and what factors explain the inflation differential between Jembrana and other regencies and cities in Bali Province despite their operation under the same policy framework.

The purchasing power of the Jembrana community has come under significant pressure in recent years, creating economic vulnerability that provides an important context for understanding consumption dynamics during HBK. Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita at current prices in Jembrana was recorded at IDR 51.73 million per year in 2024, while per capita monthly expenditure reached IDR 1,245,286, representing an increase of 11.7

percent since 2021. For a small family with one child, monthly living expenses may reach IDR 7–8 million, exceeding the financial capacity of many Jembrana residents who depend on agricultural and informal-sector incomes. With the working-age population accounting for 64.53 percent of the total population of 329,350 in 2024, sustained pressure on purchasing power creates substantial economic vulnerability, particularly among low-income households and informal-sector workers with limited access to adequate social protection.

Jembrana Regency also has a strong sociocultural character, in which the observance of religious holidays, particularly within the Hindu tradition, such as Galungan, Kuningan, and Nyepi, carries not only spiritual significance but also directly influences community consumption patterns. During these periods, demand for various food commodities, ceremonial materials, and worship-related necessities increases simultaneously and recurrently, placing additional pressure on the prices and distribution of staple goods. This indicates that inflation during the HBK period in Jembrana cannot be understood merely as an economic phenomenon but must also be viewed as one shaped by local sociocultural dynamics. Accordingly, effective inflation control requires collaborative governance capable of anticipating demand surges in a context-sensitive and coordinated manner.

Previous research has extensively discussed seasonal inflation during religious holidays and the effectiveness of TPID programs, but it has largely focused on patterns of price increases, program evaluation, or public communication strategies. Research specifically evaluating the collaborative governance of inflation control during the HBK period at the regency level, particularly by examining dimensions such as inter-actor dialogue, trust building, commitment to the process, nongovernmental participation, and the influence of the local sociocultural context, remains limited. This gap provides the academic foundation for the present study.

The novelty of this study lies in its evaluative focus on the collaborative governance of inflation control during National Religious Holidays at the regency level, with Jembrana Regency as the case study. This study not only assesses the effectiveness of TPID coordination but also explores how the sociocultural dynamics of community consumption during HBK influence inter-actor collaboration, thereby extending regional inflation-control research beyond conventional program evaluation toward a contextual evaluation of collaborative governance. Based on this background, the central issue addressed in this study is not merely the occurrence of price increases during the HBK period, but rather how collaborative governance for inflation control is implemented in Jembrana Regency, the extent to which it is effective, and the factors that support or hinder its effectiveness.

Based on the preceding background, this study aims to: (1) analyze the implementation of collaborative governance in inflation control during National Religious Holidays in Jembrana Regency; (2) identify the supporting and inhibiting factors affecting the effectiveness of TPID's collaborative governance during the HBK period; and (3) determine the impact of collaborative governance implementation on inflation control during the HBK period in Jembrana Regency.

METHOD

Research Location

This research was conducted in Jembrana Regency, Bali Province. The location was purposively selected because of its strategic role in Bali's distribution network. Jembrana Regency is located at the western tip of Bali Island and serves as the main land-distribution gateway connecting Bali and Java through the Ketapang–Gilimanuk ferry route. This position made Jembrana an important corridor for the distribution of staple goods, fuel, construction materials, and tourism-related supplies entering Bali, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Freight Vehicle Volume through the Gilimanuk-Ketapang Crossing, 2023-2025

Year	Freight Vehicle Volume (Units/Year)	Estimated Cargo Volume (Tons)
2023	1,680,120	6,250,000
2024	1,750,300	6,800,000
2025	1,810,500	7,150,000

Source: BPS Kabupaten Jembrana / PT ASDP Indonesia Ferry (2026), data reprocessed by the authors. Freight categories include medium trucks, heavy trucks, and articulated (tronton) trucks.

Consequently, Jembrana was particularly exposed to price fluctuations because a substantial share of staple goods entering Bali from Java passed through the regency, especially during HBK periods. Seasonal increases in demand during religious holidays also contributed to distinctive inflationary pressures in the region. The Economic and Development Affairs Section of the Jembrana Regency Secretariat was selected as the primary institutional locus because it coordinated data collection and interagency activities related to regional inflation control. Through this unit, TPID coordinated cross-sector efforts to stabilize the prices of strategic commodities.

Research Design

This study employed a descriptive method with a qualitative approach. Data collected are in the form of words or images rather than numbers; once analysed, the data are described so that they can be readily understood by others (Sugiyono, 2023). Through this design, the study seeks an in-depth and evaluative understanding of how collaborative governance for inflation control is implemented during the HBK period in Jembrana Regency, the factors that support and hinder it, and the extent to which this governance is able to respond to emerging seasonal inflation challenges.

Types and Sources of Data

The data used in this study consist of qualitative data as the primary data type and supporting quantitative data. Qualitative data comprise narratives, descriptions, views, experiences, and interpretations of informants regarding the phenomenon under study, obtained through in-depth interviews, field observation, and documentation study. Quantitative data, comprising regional inflation trends, strategic-commodity prices, budget realisation, and regional socio-economic statistics, are used not for independent statistical analysis but as supporting context that strengthens interpretation of the qualitative findings. Based on their source, data are classified into primary data, obtained directly by the researcher through interaction with informants and field observation, and secondary data, obtained from administrative, policy, performance, and statistical documents already available prior to the study. The use of multiple data types and sources enabled triangulation, strengthening the depth and validity of the findings.

Data Collection Techniques

Data were collected through three complementary techniques. Non-participatory observation was conducted directly at locations related to inflation-control implementation, allowing the researcher to capture inter-actor interaction patterns, coordination dynamics, and the socio-economic context surrounding collaborative governance, without the researcher becoming directly involved in ongoing activities. In-depth, semi-structured interviews constituted the principal technique, using an interview guide developed from the research questions, theoretical framework, and operational definitions, allowing the researcher to probe key topics while giving informants room to elaborate freely; interviews were recorded with informant consent and transcribed for further analysis. Documentation study was used to examine written and electronic documents related to regional inflation governance-legal bases, institutional structures, policies, programmes, meeting minutes, price and inflation data, activity reports, and evaluation documents-relevant to the research focus.

Research Informants

Informants were determined through purposive sampling, selected based on their direct or indirect involvement in regional inflation control, their adequate knowledge of the coordination process, and their capacity to represent diverse perspectives among actors with differing positions, interests, and experience. Informants were divided into key informants, who hold a strategic position and direct involvement in planning, coordination, decision-making, and policy implementation, and supporting informants, who have direct experience of policy implementation dynamics and market conditions but are not necessarily in a decision-making position. The number of informants was not fixed in advance but adjusted to data saturation, as summarised in Table 5.

Table 5. Research Informants

No.	Informant	N	Description
1	Regional Secretary of Jembrana Regency	1	Supervises the Regional Secretariat and serves as Daily Executive Chair of TPID
2	Assistant for Development and People's Welfare, Regional Secretariat	1	Coordinates development and welfare affairs; TPID Secretary
3	Head of the Cooperatives, SMEs, and Trade Office	1	Handles cooperatives, SMEs, and trade affairs; TPID member
4	Head of the Communication and Informatics Office	1	Handles public-information management; TPID member
5	Head of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section	1	Technically responsible for economic affairs; TPID member
6	Staff of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section	1	Civil servant intensively supporting TPID technical work
7	Market traders	4	Sellers of staple goods to the community
8	Market consumers/community members	10	Beneficiary members of the community
	Total	16	

Source: primary data, processed by the authors.

Data Validity Technique

Following (Creswell, 2018) data validity was ensured through triangulation, member checking, researcher reflexivity, and persistent observation combined with prolonged engagement. Triangulation was conducted by comparing information from different sources and collection techniques (source and technique triangulation); member checking involved re-confirming interview results or the researcher's initial interpretation with informants; researcher reflexivity involved critical awareness of the researcher's background, experience, assumptions, and potential bias; and persistent observation with prolonged engagement involved repeated review of interview, observation, and documentation data to identify recurring patterns, relationships, and discrepancies.

Data Analysis Technique

Data analysis followed the interactive qualitative model of (Miles & Huberman, 2014) , as elaborated by Sugiyono (2017), comprising four intertwined stages: data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data collection involved compiling information from interviews, field notes, and documentation and preparing it for analysis. Data reduction involved selecting, focusing, simplifying, and abstracting raw field data into themes related to the implementation of collaborative governance within the TPID forum, inter-actor coordination mechanisms, decision-making processes, policy implementation, and the socio-economic and consumption dynamics of the HBK period. Data display presented the reduced and categorised data in the form of systematic narrative description, supplemented by direct informant quotations as empirical evidence and thematic tables/matrices where necessary. Conclusion drawing/verification was built progressively from the beginning of the analysis process, through repeated reading of the data, triangulation, clarification with informants when necessary, and reflection on the interpretation process, so that conclusions are firmly grounded in strong and relevant empirical evidence.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Implementation of Collaborative Governance in Inflation Control during the HBK Period in Jembrana

Collaborative governance in inflation control during the period of National Religious Holidays (HBKN) aims to anticipate surges in staple-goods demand that could trigger significant price increases. Based on TPID's working guidelines, price-shock control during HBKN is carried out through a comprehensive strategy grounded in the 4K principles (Price Affordability, Supply Availability, Distribution Smoothness, and Effective Communication), implemented through: (1) low-cost/cheap market operations targeted at low-income groups ahead of HBKN; (2) strengthened distribution oversight involving law-enforcement actors (such as the Food Task Force) to prevent hoarding and price manipulation; (3) traffic-flow arrangements for distribution transport ahead of HBKN to ensure smooth goods flow and minimise logistics costs; (4) intensive cross-agency coordination involving business actors, associations, distributors, and state/regional enterprises to guarantee supply availability; and (5) effective public-communication protocols led by the head of the region as TPID Chair, including engagement with religious and community leaders, to anchor inflation expectations, moderate consumption, and prevent panic buying.

> "The duties of the Regional Inflation Control Team (TPID) in controlling inflation and price stabilisation in its territory have been regulated under Presidential Decree No. 23 of 2017, so TPID carries out its duties according to that provision. This TPID policy is one of the Government's strategies to give a direct impact on the community, particularly

in maintaining the achievement of the annual inflation target, regional competitiveness, and community purchasing power." (Head of the Economy and Development Section, Jembrana Regional Secretariat)

Starting Conditions

In the collaborative-governance discourse of Ansell and Gash (2008), the success of a cross-institutional forum is largely determined by three starting-condition dimensions. Within TPID Jembrana's governance, these three preconditions form a complex bureaucratic dynamic in maintaining regional economic stability.

Power, Resource, and Knowledge Imbalances. The 2023 regional election shifted the leadership of Jembrana from the previous Regent (2020-2024) to a newly elected Regent, a transition that required budget-implementation-document (DPA) and programme adjustments across regional agencies to align with the new leadership's vision, creating a temporary resource disparity. The Head of the Economy and Development Section explained that this leadership transition was one of the factors influencing the adjustment of budgetary and resource needs across agencies involved in TPID. Concretely, food-infrastructure control and operational budget are concentrated in the Agriculture and Food Office, while daily price-fluctuation monitoring (knowledge) is dominated by the Cooperatives, SMEs, and Trade Office (DKUP) through its SP2KP reporting system, and Government Rice Reserve (CBP) logistics are held by a vertical agency, Bulog. This condition necessitates absolute interdependence, since no single agency can formulate market-operation policy in isolation without data and goods supply from other entities, as confirmed by the Acting Head of DKUP, who stressed that daily price-fluctuation data on 20 strategic commodities monitored in traditional markets must be shared within the TPID consolidation forum so that the Agriculture Office can project proportional supply interventions.

Table 6. OPD Budget Distribution within TPID Governance, FY 2024

Collaboration Focus	Leading Sector	TPID Budget Ceiling 2024 (IDR)	Available Resources
Supply Availability (Largest Budget)	**Agriculture and Food Office**	4,888,188,288	Seed assistance & agricultural infrastructure
Price Affordability (Market Operations)	Cooperatives, SMEs, and Trade Office (DKUP)	16,476,000	Daily price monitoring (SP2KP) & SPHP distribution
Distribution Smoothness (Infrastructure)	Transportation Office / DPKP	1,091,859,250	Transport facilities & logistics
Effective Communication (Data & Information)	Economic Affairs Section & DKUP	20,106,800	Coordination meetings & public price publication

Source: TPID Quarter IV 2024 Report, reprocessed by the authors.

Table 6 clearly validates the informants' statements regarding resource inequality following the regional leadership transition. The data show extreme polarisation: the Agriculture and Food Office controls dominant physical logistics and budget (IDR 4,888,188,288), while DKUP is allocated only IDR 16,476,000 yet holds the crucial daily price-monitoring instrument (SP2KP). This disparity empirically demonstrates that no single regional agency can work alone; DKUP's budgetary limitation is compensated by its command of market information/knowledge, which is highly crucial for the Agriculture Office and Bulog to execute their supply budget precisely. Ansell and Gash (2008) emphasise that resource inequality can become a catalyst for collaboration when managed through interdependence. Ahead of Balinese religious holidays such as Galungan, Kuningan, or Nyepi, market demand surges sharply; DKUP, poor in budget but rich in daily price data, is compelled to collaborate with the well-funded Agriculture Office to secure food supply. This asymmetry does not lead to domination but to a symbiotic collaboration that complements each other to maintain price stability during religious holidays.

Incentives for and Constraints on Participation. The instructional mandate from the Ministry of Home Affairs to attend the weekly online National Coordination Meeting (Rakornas) on Inflation Control creates a strong structural incentive and political urgency for TPID Jembrana to participate actively. However, cross-sector participation also faces real constraints, such as budget-absorption stagnation and external shocks in the form of weather anomalies (El Niño/La Niña) that shift the rice-harvest season. These administrative constraints test the resilience of collaboration and demand rapid policy innovation beyond traditional bureaucratic boundaries.

> "The mandate from the Ministry of Home Affairs to control inflation is the highest instructional incentive, where TPID's performance reports are nationally monitored, so all regional-government elements are driven to suppress the inflation rate as an indicator of regional leadership success." (Regional Secretary of Jembrana Regency)
>
> "If we look at the available data, our biggest technical obstacle is synchronising the acceleration of inflation-control budget realisation across each OPD amid the pressure of extreme El Niño weather that delays the planting season." (Head of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section).

Table 7. Incentives and Constraints in TPID Governance, FY 2024

TPID Evaluation Category	Description
Total Inflation-Control Budget 2024	IDR 6,016,630,338
Budget Realisation as of November 2024	IDR 3,017,755,909
Budget-Realisation Percentage	50.16%
Main Field Constraint	Delayed budget adjustment and realisation, El Niño climate anomaly shifting the rice planting season, global CPO price fluctuation

Source: TPID Quarter IV 2024 Report, reprocessed by the authors.

Table 7 provides quantitative legitimacy to the informants' statements. The total 2024 inflation-control budget exceeded IDR 6 billion, yet realisation by November 2024 had only reached 50.16 percent. This absorption gap validates the claim that administrative constraints and external shocks (El Niño) are genuine field obstacles, while the obligation to report this indicator at the Rakornas pushes the Jembrana Regional Government to keep innovating amid stagnation, proving that the ministerial mandate functions as a participation incentive that keeps collaboration running. On the communication front, the Acting Head of the Communication and Informatics Office stated that the incentive in the communication field is to maintain public trust through education and transparent price-information dissemination, thereby preventing panic buying whenever supply constraints occur at the distributor level (Santoso et al., 2013).

Prehistory of Cooperation or Conflict. Based on its track record, TPID Jembrana's actors have a highly intensive history of cooperation and minimal meaningful sectoral conflict. Initial trust has been capitalised through repetitive face-to-face meetings and field coordination, such as dozens of Cheap Market and Cheap Food Movement events throughout 2024 that routinely synergise DKUP, Perumda Tribhuwana, the District Military Command (Kodim), the Police Resort (Polres), and Bulog on the same field. This institutional routine reduces bureaucratic transaction costs and creates solid social cohesion when responding to crises, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8. History of Inter-Actor Collaboration within TPID, FY 2024

Form of Collaboration	Collaborators	Implementation Intensity
Regular and Holiday (HBK) Cheap Market	DKUP, Bulog, Kodim 1617	14 times
Joint Market Operation with Regional Enterprises	Perumda Tribhuwana, Bulog	10 times
Cheap Food Movement (GPM)	Agriculture and Food Office	2 times
Routine National Coordination Meeting (Rakornas)	All TPID members (cross-OPD)	Weekly (every Monday via Zoom)

Source: TPID Quarter IV 2024 Report, reprocessed by the authors.

Table 8 empirically validates the informants' claim regarding the absence of meaningful sectoral ego. Recurring activities such as the Cheap Market, held up to 14 times together with Kodim and Bulog, the Joint Market Operation held 10 times with regional enterprises, and the weekly Rakornas naturally form initial trust. This activity frequency confirms that inter-actor communication is not merely a self-reported claim but the outcome of a consistent, repeated, and well-institutionalised history of cooperation, exactly matching Ansell and Gash's (2008) proposition that a track record of past cooperation determines the level of initial trust. When facing a religious-holiday inflation shock that demands a rapid response, TPID Jembrana no longer wastes time debating jurisdictional boundaries or sectoral ego, because trust has already been solidly built through dozens of prior routine interactions (Jamal et al., 2024).

Institutional Design

According to Ansell and Gash (2008), the effectiveness of collaborative governance depends heavily on institutional design, which establishes protocols and ground rules for the actors involved, built on four essential indicators: participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness, clear ground rules, and process transparency.

Strengthening the institutional capacity of TPID is critical given the region's macroeconomic dynamics. Although the number of poor residents in Jembrana in 2025 was successfully reduced to 12.45 thousand people (4.33%), the poverty line simultaneously increased to IDR 554,136 per capita per month, indicating growing vulnerability of purchasing power amid a slowing regional economic growth rate of 4.33 percent, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Poverty and Economic-Growth Indicators of Jembrana Regency, 2023-2025

Indicator	2023	2024	2025
Number of Poor Residents (persons)	14,120	12,900	12,450
Percentage of Poor Residents (%)	-	4.51	4.33
Poverty Line (IDR/capita/month)	-	531,164	554,136
Economic Growth Rate (%)	4.96	4.98 / 4.51*	4.33
Open Unemployment Rate (%)	2.52	1.53	1.64

Source: Jembrana Regency in Figures 2024-2026, reprocessed by the authors. *Figures for economic growth in 2024 differ slightly between source tables in the original TPID documentation and are reported as published.

Table 9 illustrates an intersecting phenomenon. On one hand, the poverty line rose from IDR 531,164 to IDR 554,136 per capita/month, indicating rising staple-goods prices (inflation). On the other hand, the number of poor residents actually fell from 12.90 thousand (4.51%) to 12.45 thousand (4.33%), even as regional economic growth slowed from 4.98 to 4.33 percent. The rising poverty line is a direct proxy for inflationary pressure, which historically always escalates during the HBK period due to demand-pull inflation. The simultaneous decline in poverty amid a rising poverty line and slowing growth demonstrates that targeted structural and non-structural government intervention-rather than free-market mechanisms-has protected vulnerable groups from falling below the poverty line when prices surge during religious holidays. This tangible threat to welfare becomes a strong catalyst for stakeholders such as the Regional Government, Bank Indonesia, the Food Task Force, and the private sector to collaborate, validating the urgency of collaborative governance as an indispensable instrument of regional inflation control.

> "We ensure that all elements, both technical regional apparatus (OPD) and cross-sectoral vertical agencies, are inclusively and actively involved in TPID membership to formulate comprehensive inflation-control policy in Jembrana." (Regional Secretary, Daily Executive Chair of TPID)

Regarding forum exclusiveness, TPID has been positioned not as a mere formality but as the sole and authoritative venue for cross-sectoral policy integration, as affirmed by the Assistant for Development and People's Welfare: "TPID coordination meetings have been functioned as the primary venue, not merely a complementary forum. This is the only estuary where cross-sectoral strategic commitments and decisions are genuinely agreed upon, particularly in responding to staple-goods price fluctuations in an integrated manner." This exclusivity effectively closes the space for fragmented sectoral policy, ensuring no OPD acts unilaterally or seeks an "alternative path" outside the collaborative forum, strengthening policy integration, suppressing sectoral ego, and giving full binding legitimacy to resulting market interventions (Yopiannor, 2025).

Clear ground rules were confirmed by the Acting Head of DKUP, who noted that having clear rules within the collaboration greatly eased his office's execution of technical policy such as cheap-market operations, because the duties, authority, and operational boundaries of each TPID agency have been firmly divided. This is reflected in the steady decline of the number of families receiving subsidised-rice (SPHP/Raskin) assistance shown in Table 10, which follows the corresponding decline in the poverty rate.

Table 10. Subsidised Rice (SPHP/Raskin) Assistance Recipients, 2023-2025

Year	Recipient Households (KK)	Rice Distribution Realisation (Tons)
2023	15,382	18,124
2024	13,576	16,229
2025	13,316	13,316

Source: Jembrana Regency in Figures 2024-2026, reprocessed by the authors.

During the HBK period, rice distribution from Bulog's warehouse functions not merely as social assistance but as a market intervention instrument to dampen rice-price shocks, one of the main contributors to volatile-food inflation, ensuring grassroots-level supply security and preventing panic buying and speculative pricing by large traders ahead of religious holidays.

Process transparency was implemented from the technical monitoring level through to public-policy dissemination. A staff member of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section explained that daily commodity-price movement data and supply-chain reports monitored in the field are always shared openly within the forum, so that policy evaluation can be accessed and objectively critiqued by all TPID members, while the Acting Head of the Communication and Informatics Office affirmed responsibility for disseminating TPID's strategic operational steps rapidly to the public to prevent information gaps and panic buying. Internally, trust-building among TPID members is solidly established through open access to daily commodity-price and supply-chain data, allowing objective and measurable policy evaluation, while externally, transparency and public accountability are executed through responsive dissemination of strategic information, an especially effective mitigation instrument during the HBK period when demand surges often trigger price volatility and unstable market sentiment.

Facilitative Leadership

Facilitative leadership is a central element of the collaborative-governance model of Ansell and Gash (2008), in which the leader transitions from a sole decision-making authority into a mediator orchestrating cross-sectoral collaboration. This leadership is highly crucial in Jembrana, particularly in responding to development dynamics that demand a high degree of synergy, especially during the HBK period when maintaining an economic growth rate of 4.33 percent and suppressing open unemployment to 1.64 percent in 2025 (see Table 9) requires effective TPID performance.

Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Differing perspectives between macro-policy regulators and technical implementers frequently trigger communication deadlock within TPID. The Assistant for Development and People's Welfare, as TPID Secretary, confirmed that technical cross-agency debate often occurs when formulating market interventions, and that the leader's role is to mediate, ease tension, and ensure decisions are genuinely constructive without being dominated by a single sector's ego, a function that extends into field-data synchronisation, as confirmed by the Head of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section, who noted that differences between real field-stock data and paper projections often trigger friction, resolved through routine and open mediation before becoming policy.

Empowerment of Weaker Actors. Ansell and Gash (2008) caution that collaborative governance is highly vulnerable to domination by resource-rich institutions (power imbalance); the facilitative leader must therefore guarantee proportional participatory space for marginal groups and technical-hierarchy elements. The Acting Head of DKUP explained that direction is always clear so that price-stability policy does not neglect the fate of small traders, ensuring that the complaints and aspirations of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in traditional markets remain empowered, heard, and accommodated as a basis for TPID policy. This is corroborated by the dominance of self-employment (UMKM/small traders) within Jembrana's employment structure, in which the self-employed category accounts for 57,005 of the regency's 199,371 working population. A staff member of the Economy Section further confirmed that although occupying a purely implementing-staff position, TPID leadership always provides equal room to present field realities, with staff input taken seriously in formulating technical steps (Subanda, 2026).

Collaborative Process

The formal foundation of TPID's cross-sectoral cooperation is legally embodied in the Joint Agreement between the Denpasar City Government and the Jembrana Regency Government (No. 415.4/12/KB/BKS/2023 and No. 415.4/32/KB/PEM/2023), whose scope explicitly covers economic development, food security, and regional inflation control. The Regional Secretary confirmed that inflation control cannot be managed independently and must go through strategic inter-regional cooperation, such as the agreement with the Denpasar City Government, to secure the supply chain and maintain sustainable food-price stability.

Beyond inter-regional cooperation, the Jembrana Regency Government accommodates non-governmental actors by involving the cooperative sector through Jembrana Regent Regulation No. 3 of 2024 concerning Procedures for the Provision and Repayment of Regional Loans to Cooperatives, targeting Producer Cooperatives, Cacao Cooperatives, Weaving Cooperatives, and MSME Marketing Cooperatives, aimed at preventing a price collapse of unhulled rice (gabah) during the main harvest, maintaining farm-gate price stability, and improving cooperative members' welfare. Based on the Budget Implementation Document (DPA) of the Jembrana Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency (BPKAD) for FY 2025, the regional government realised its commitment through IDR 5,400,000,000 in financing expenditure for regional loans to cooperatives, as detailed in Table 11.

Table 11. Budget Realisation for Regional Loans to Cooperatives, FY 2025

Target Sector/Commodity	Main Implementing Entity	Budget Allocation (IDR)	Absorption Share (%)
Unhulled Rice (Gabah) Procurement	Producer Cooperative	1,900,000,000	35.18
Cacao Bean Purchase	Cacao Cooperative	1,500,000,000	27.78
Weaving Product Absorption	Weaving Cooperative	1,000,000,000	18.52
MSME Product Absorption	Marketing Cooperative	1,000,000,000	18.52
Total Financing Intervention	-	5,400,000,000	100.00

Source: BPKAD Jembrana Budget Implementation Document FY 2025, reprocessed by the authors.

Table 11 quantitatively validates the scale of financial intervention channelled as a liquidity instrument for cooperatives. In Ansell and Gash's (2008) framework, this measurable financial-resource availability is an undeniable manifestation of commitment to process; collaborative-governance frameworks frequently stall at the implementation stage due to a lack of real resource support, yet with an IDR 5.4-billion liquidity injection-of which the largest share, 35.18 percent, is dedicated to gabah absorption-the Jembrana Regency Government demonstrates that this policy's primary orientation is preventive food-security strengthening. This budgetary support becomes a crucial catalyst for achieving intermediate outcomes: through this liquidity capacity, TPID enables cooperatives to acquire vital commodities earlier, so that when a demand shock hits the market during HBK (Galungan, Kuningan, Nyepi, and Idul Fitri), the government has already independently secured a buffer stock, minimising dependence on external distribution chains and reinforcing TPID's collaborative resilience in taming market speculation and seasonal inflationary pressure.

Public communication transparency and partnership with the national food-supply network are equally decisive for producing optimal intermediate outcomes. The Acting Head of the Communication and Informatics Office affirmed that Diskominfo's role within TPID is to maintain transparent public-information management and massively disseminate commodity-price developments and market-operation schedules to prevent panic buying, particularly during the HBK period, which is highly prone to triggering inflation, as reflected in the intensity of digital communication interventions summarised in Table 12.

Table 12. Digital Communication Interventions during the HBK Period

Public Communication Channel	Daily Price-Publication Frequency	Estimated Audience Reach	Market-Operation Schedule Publications
Official Regional-Government Social Media	21 posts	45,500 reach	8 publications
Regional Government Radio Broadcast	42 broadcast sessions	Cross-subdistrict	14 public-service ad spots
Official Website/TPID Portal	Real-time updates	12,000 visitors	Integrated banner

Source: Jembrana Kominfo Office Profile (2025), reprocessed by the authors.

Table 12 illustrates the massive scale of digital-communication and broadcasting intervention undertaken by the Communication and Informatics Office throughout the critical period surrounding National Religious Holidays. Within Ansell and Gash's (2008) collaborative-governance framework, data transparency and communication intensity are primary instruments of trust building. Continuous dissemination of commodity prices and market-operation schedules minimises information asymmetry within the community. Evaluation of religious-holiday inflation governance shows that consumer psychological factors are as important as physical stock availability; strengthened public literacy and trust in TPID's food-supply guarantee directly help mitigate panic buying and hoarding behaviour.

Overall, the implementation of collaborative governance in inflation control during the HBK period in Jembrana Regency has been carried out comprehensively and systematically through TPID, in line with the collaborative-governance framework in which every stage, from starting conditions and institutional design to facilitative leadership and the collaborative process, has been well implemented. At the starting-conditions stage, resource and budget inequality among regional agencies has been successfully transformed into complementary symbiotic collaboration, driven by high initial trust from a history of past cooperation and national instructional incentives. Institutional design has also been structured inclusively with clear ground rules, while functioning TPID coordination meetings as the primary and authoritative venue for cross-sectoral strategic agreement. Facilitative leadership has effectively mediated technical sectoral-ego conflict, empowered weaker actors such as MSMEs, and built cross-agency trust through data transparency. The peak of this collaborative process is evidenced by tangible institutional and financial commitment, namely the issuance of Jembrana Regent Regulation No. 3 of 2024 and the IDR 5.4-billion budget intervention for cooperative financing to secure buffer stock.

Policy Evaluation using Dunn's Criteria

The collaborative governance of inflation control during the HBK period was evaluated against William Dunn's six criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, equity, responsiveness, and appropriateness (Dunn, 2008).

Effectiveness is confirmed by the sustained purchasing power of vulnerable groups, evidenced by the poverty rate declining from 4.51% (12,900 persons) in 2024 to 4.33% (12,450 persons) in 2025 despite a rising poverty line. Routine market operations and social-safety-net distribution, legally anchored in the TPID structure spanning the Regent, Police, and Bulog, have consistently dampened food-price shocks during religious holidays.

Efficiency is demonstrated by how resource asymmetry across agencies was converted into complementary strength. In FY 2024, the Agriculture and Food Office held a dominant budget (IDR 4.89 billion) for supply infrastructure while DKUP, with only IDR 16.5 million, supplied the real-time price data (SP2KP) that guided precise market operations, minimising supply waste. Although total 2024 budget absorption stalled at 50.16% due to climate shocks, the government responded efficiently by channelling IDR 5.4 billion in low-interest cooperative loans to secure early gabah and cacao absorption from farmers.

Adequacy is partially met. Short-term price surges were addressed through 14 Cheap Market operations and two Cheap Food Movements, but the underlying supply problem persists: paddy-field area shrank from 6,548.48 ha (2024) to 6,281.23 ha (2025), and brown planthopper attacks expanded to 531 ha in 2025. Informants acknowledged that El Niño-driven planting-season shifts and bureaucratic absorption delays mean TPID still functions more as a short-term "fire extinguisher" than as a solution to Jembrana's structural food self-sufficiency problem.

Equity is fulfilled for both consumers and producers. Subsidised-rice (SPHP/Raskin) recipients declined in tandem with falling poverty (13,316 households, 13,316 tons in 2025), showing distribution is reaching the most marginal groups. Producer-side equity is realised through Jembrana Regent Regulation No. 3/2024, which channels financing to Producer, Cacao, Weaving, and MSME Marketing Cooperatives protecting the region's 57,005 self-employed workers.

Responsiveness is strongly fulfilled. TPID's clear legal division of tasks and weekly coordination meetings allow rapid mediation of sectoral data conflicts before they affect policy. Transparent, intensive public communication on staple-goods prices has successfully prevented panic buying during HBK periods.

Appropriateness is largely met through TPID as a single definitive coordination forum, including inter-regional cooperation such as the Joint Agreement with Denpasar City. However, medium-term appropriateness needs sharpening: cacao, with 6,340 ha planted and 3,278.56 tons harvested in 2025, still lacks robust downstream (hilirisasi) governance to maximise its economic value for farmers.

Inhibiting Factors in TPID Jembrana's Governance

Four structural and administrative constraints limit optimal inflation control, despite TPID's overall effectiveness in reducing poverty and dampening short-term shocks.

First, initial resource inequality and budget-absorption stagnation followed the 2023 leadership transition, as DPA and OPD programmes required realignment. Inflation-control fund absorption reached only 50.16% (IDR 3.02 billion of a ceiling exceeding IDR 6 billion) by November 2024, while DKUP's market-operation budget remained just IDR 16.5 million. As the Regional Secretary explained: "The leadership transition required us to synchronise vision-mission within the DPA... the sharp decline in Social Assistance and BTT allocations in 2025 directly weakened our fiscal intervention capacity."

Second, external shocks beyond regional control — El Niño-driven shifts in planting/harvest seasons and global CPO price fluctuations — constrain TPID's flexibility during demand surges. Demographic imbalance compounds this: Negara Subdistrict's population density (1,037/km²) creates a demand-shock epicentre highly asymmetric to peripheral areas like Pekutatan (282/km²) (Table 13).

Third, upstream agrarian vulnerability threatens long-term food self-sufficiency, with shrinking paddy-field area and expanding brown-planthopper damage (531 ha in 2025). As the Head of the Economy, Natural Resources, and Development Administration Section put it: "TPID's current policy intervention still tends to function as a short-term 'fire extinguisher'... without structural improvement in upstream agriculture, it is very difficult for TPID to guarantee absolute regional food self-sufficiency."

Fourth, downstream governance for flagship commodities like cacao remains underdeveloped despite existing financing interventions.

Notably, information asymmetry is no longer a constraint — the Communication and Informatics Office's transparent price data has proven effective in preventing panic buying, confirming that the primary bottlenecks lie in the starting-conditions and external-constraints dimensions rather than the collaborative process itself.

Impact of Collaborative Governance

TPID Jembrana, institutionalised through Regent Decree No. 72/EKBANG/2026, integrates regional agencies, vertical institutions (Bank Indonesia, Jembrana Police), and private/community actors through the 4K strategy. This produced significant 2024–2025 gains: rice production rose 37.15% (51,412.75 to 70,510.39 tons), a new shallot-production base of 97.90 tons was created, chili production grew 12.91%, and Bali cattle and pig populations rose 10.87% and 9.51% respectively (Table 14).

Triangulated trader testimony confirms these gains translated into market stability. A staple-goods trader noted that unlike previous years' pre-Galungan/Lebaran scarcity, "local Jembrana rice stock has routinely come down regularly... no one over-purchases out of fear of running out." A spice trader reported that local shallot supply, once reliant on outside regions, is now stable enough that "my retail selling price does not jump around." Livestock traders similarly confirmed sufficient local cattle and pork/chicken supply kept prices fair ahead of Galungan, Kuningan, and Idul Fitri.

At the consumer level, all but one of ten informants affirmed that TPID's cheap-market programmes protected household purchasing power ahead of religious holidays. One dissenting informant the only male in the consumer group noted no direct benefit reached him personally, signalling that outreach and beneficiary targeting still require broader, more even penetration.

Overall, TPID Jembrana has transformed inter-agency resource asymmetry into a collaborative force (Ansell & Gash, 2008), converting starting-condition weaknesses into interdependence and measurable production gains. Evaluated through Dunn's framework, this success is effective, efficient, equitable, and responsive, though adequacy and appropriateness for long-term food self-sufficiency remain only partially fulfilled.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative governance for inflation control during National Religious Holidays in Jembrana Regency was implemented comprehensively through TPID's 4K strategy. This approach successfully transformed interagency resource asymmetries into symbiotic collaboration, helped sustain the purchasing power of vulnerable groups, and proved effective, efficient, equitable, and responsive based on Dunn's evaluation criteria, although its long-term adequacy and appropriateness in supporting food self-sufficiency remained only partially fulfilled. The main inhibiting factors included stagnation in budget absorption following the 2023 leadership transition, external climate shocks such as El Niño, the reduction in paddy-field area, pest infestations, and suboptimal downstream governance of flagship commodities such as cacao. The collaboration produced measurable impacts, including a 37.15 percent increase in rice production, the establishment of a local shallot production base, and growth in livestock populations, all of which helped buffer demand-pull inflation and prevent panic buying, as confirmed by both traders and consumers. However, a dissenting account from one consumer informant indicated that outreach still needed to be expanded. Accordingly, the Jembrana Regency Government should accelerate the synchronization of interagency budgets and programs following leadership transitions to ensure that price-stabilization funds can be utilized effectively from the beginning of the fiscal year; TPID should shift its emphasis from short-term market interventions toward longer-term structural measures that strengthen the resilience of the agricultural sector to climate shocks and pest infestations; the regional government should improve technical infrastructure and downstream governance for high-value commodities such as cacao to maximize economic benefits for local farmers; interregional collaborative arrangements, including the agreement with Denpasar City, should be maintained and expanded to strengthen cross-regional food logistics; and TPID should evaluate and broaden the coverage and beneficiary targeting of its Pasar Murah/Bazaar program so that distribution points are allocated more evenly and accurately across the intended population.

REFERENCES

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *18*(4), 543–571.

Ascari, G., & Fosso, S. (2024). Structural inflation dynamics and the role of globalization. *Journal of International Economics*, *156*(3), 103–122.

Bali, B. P. S. P. (2025). *Inflasi Provinsi Bali tahun 2025*. BPS Provinsi Bali.

Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., de Haan, J., & Jansen, D.-J. (2024). Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? *Journal of Economic Literature*, *62*(2), 425–457. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20231683

Blinder, A. S., & Reis, R. (2022). A Pound of Flesh. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, *125*, 94–112.

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature. *Public Administration Review*, *66*(1), 44–55.

Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kueng, L., & Silvia, J. (2025). Inflation, Expectations & Monetary Policy: What Have We Learned? *Journal of Economic Literature*, *63*(2), 187–215.

Creswell, J. W. (2018). *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. SAGE Publications.

Dunn, W. N. (2008). *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction*. Pearson Education.

Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *22*(1), 1–29.

Gupta, R., & Dabas, D. (2018). Seasonal patterns of food inflation in India. *Applied Economics Letters*, *25*(8), 542–546.

Indonesia, B. (2023). *Supply-side policies to address the trend of rising inflation*. Bank Indonesia.

Jamal, J., Mansur, I., Rasid, A., Mulyadi, M., Dihyah Marwan, M., & Marwan, M. (2024). Evaluating the shading effect of photovoltaic panels to optimize the performance ratio of a solar power system. *Results in Engineering*, *21*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rineng.2024.101878

Jembrana, B. P. S. K. (2026). *Kabupaten Jembrana dalam angka 2026*. BPS Kabupaten Jembrana.

Jembrana, P. K. (2024a). *Peraturan Bupati Jembrana Nomor 3 Tahun 2024 tentang Tata Cara Pemberian dan Penerimaan Kembali Pinjaman Daerah Kepada Koperasi*. Pemerintah Kabupaten Jembrana.

Jembrana, P. K. (2024b). *Peraturan Bupati Jembrana Nomor 3 Tahun 2024 tentang Tata Cara Pemberian dan Penerimaan Kembali Pinjaman Daerah Kepada Koperasi*. Pemerintah Kabupaten Jembrana.

Jembrana, P. K. (2026a). *Keputusan Bupati Jembrana Nomor 72/EKBANG/2026 tentang Pembentukan Tim Pengendalian Inflasi Daerah (TPID)*. Pemerintah Kabupaten Jembrana.

Jembrana, P. K. (2026b). *Keputusan Bupati Jembrana Nomor 72/EKBANG/2026 tentang Pembentukan Tim Pengendalian Inflasi Daerah (TPID)*. Pemerintah Kabupaten Jembrana.

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative Public Management: Assessing What We Know and How We Know It. *Public Administration Review*, *66*(s1), 33–43.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (2014). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook* (3rd ed., Ed.). SAGE Publications.

Purwono, R., Siregar, R., & Hermansyah. (2020). *Explaining regional inflation programmes in Indonesia: Does inflation rate converge?* Bank Indonesia.

Santoso, W., Suselo, S. L., Nurhemi, & Suryani, G. (2013). *Pengaruh hari besar pada komoditas utama inflasi di Indonesia*. Bank Indonesia.

Subanda, N. (2026). *Inovasi pelayanan publik dan kerangka tata kelola digital pemerintah daerah*. Undiknas Press.

Sugiyono. (2023). *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, dan R&D*. Alfabeta.

Tassinari, A., Di Carlo, D., Ibsen, C. L., & Molina, O. (2024). Introduction to the special issue: Conflict and coordination in the cost-of-living crisis. *Work, Employment and Society*, *38*(3), 451–469.

Yopiannor, F. Z. (2025). Kolaborasi aktor dalam upaya pengendalian inflasi daerah di Kota Palangka Raya. *Jurnal Administrasi Publik Dan Pemerintahan STISIP Imam Bonjol (SIMBOL)*, *4*(2), 175–181.