

The Importance of Defence Intelligence Agencies in Non-Combat Military Missions: Instruments of Special Attention for Defence Capacity Building and Capabilities

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Abstract

The post-Cold War era has indeed reshaped the security paradigm, witnessing a surge in non-traditional security issues that intersect with military security concerns. The human security approach has expanded the understanding of threats to encompass phenomena like terrorism, climate change, and human trafficking. While Southeast Asia serves as a microcosm of these complexities, it's imperative not to overlook broader global security trends and perspectives. In this region, intricate security dynamics are shaped by diverse factors, including economic downturns, territorial disputes, and environmental shifts. Although non-traditional threats have gained prominence, traditional ones, such as tensions in the South China Sea, persist and demand attention. Countries like Indonesia and the Philippines have responded by bolstering their defence budgets. Moreover, there's a discernible uptick in the adoption of military operations other than war (OMSP), with a growing emphasis on humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts. However, amidst evolving international strategic landscapes, it's crucial to adapt. For instance, Indonesia's recent establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency underscores the imperative to enhance defence capabilities for non-war military missions.

Keywords: non-traditional security, southeast Asia, traditional threats, military operations, a defence intelligence agency

Introduction

The post-Cold War era has brought structural changes that have prompted a change in perspective on the definition, nature, scope, and practice of security. In Southeast Asia and globally in the early 1990s, non-traditional security and military security issues became interconnected in unprecedented ways. This is driven by the development of a human security approach discourse that expands and deepens the scope of security threats comprehensively (Hidayat, Alifah, Rodiansjah, & Asikin, 2024), according to this new approach, security includes not only traditional security or hard security, such as military aspects, but also non-traditional security elements or soft security (Dosch, 2006). Traditionally, previously,

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security threats were viewed from the point of view of state survival and the main threat to security was military conflict between states.

Today, security is also associated with a range of non-traditional issues meaning issues outside military issues, most of which are transnational or intranational, including terrorism, environmental degradation and climate change, infectious diseases, transnational crime and illegal migration (Hameiri & Jones, 2013). Non-traditional issues intersect or fall outside the scope of conventional state threats; this is because these threats are not necessarily perceived as directly threatening the existence of the state, but challenge the real capacity or perception of the state to protect the affected population (Bachmann, 2015; Hameiri & Jones, 2013).

Although often seen as a dichotomy, these two threats expand the security agenda of the entire region including Southeast Asia, which certainly affects Indonesia. Various factors, such as the economic crisis of 1997-98, transboundary environmental issues such as smog and bird flu, terrorism, and traditional security issues such as shifting power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, disputes in the South China Sea, and consequent tensions between member states to unresolved border and territorial conflicts, all bring new, increasingly complex security dynamics (Fels & Vu, 2016; Hameiri & Jones, 2013). As a consequence of the broader approach to security, security is not governed by predictable rules; rather, it relies on individual perceptions of threats, varying greatly based on the status and position of actors in the international system.

Historically, the conceptualization of security in Southeast Asia by actors has undergone a gradual transformation and is certainly influenced by the security environment and context at that time. During the Cold War and particularly after the Vietnam War for example, there was a common belief that any significant armed conflict in Southeast Asia was most likely caused by tensions between major powers or their allies, or due to unresolved territorial and border disputes, such as the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the status of Sabah. Although many territorial conflicts still occur, the overall security landscape in the region has undergone significant changes since the late 1980s. At the same time, globalization has led to a resurgence of localization, with an increased focus on local issues and a resurgence of traditional local or international conflicts that could previously be suppressed (Schuerkens, 2003).

There are at least ten non-traditional security complexities in Asia Pacific that have appeared on the radar of policymakers in the region and are beginning to impact Southeast Asian security (Caballero-Anthony, 2018). Although it is quite comprehensive, it does not mean that the ten issues above cover all traditional security threats in Southeast Asia. It is important to note that, as mentioned earlier, non-traditional security adds to the security challenges and complexities facing states rather than replacing traditional security threats.

In Southeast Asia, for example, countries still face crucial traditional security threats. One of the security threats is China's pressure in the South China Sea which continues to

increase its military capabilities and this has an impact on the arms race in the Southeast Asian region (Dede Rahmat Hidayat, Rohaya, Nadine, & Ramadhan, 2020). This can be seen in the chart below:

Some of the largest economies in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines are directly proportional to China. This increase in security budgets can be attributed to the seriousness of these countries' stemming existing threats in terms of both traditional and non-traditional threats. In the Philippines, a spokesman for the Department of National Defence under the new administration led by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stressed that by August 2022 all major military modernization contracts approved by the previous administration will resume. These include the purchase of two HDC-3100 frigates and six offshore patrol boats from South Korea, BrahMos anti-ship missiles from India and additional S-70i helicopters from Poland.

The Philippines and Indonesia also have one of the most expansive defence plans in Southeast Asia. In February 2022, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto signed an agreement with France that included the purchase of 42 Rafale fighters and two Scorpene-class submarines. In February, the U.S. government approved the sale of up to 36 F-15EX aircraft to Indonesia. However, this huge procurement plan – combined with other new contracts, including one for six FREMMs and two Maestrale-class frigates ordered from Italy, and another for two A400M transport aircraft – threatens to strain Indonesia's defence budget, which in 2021 requires presidential approval of \$2.06 billion to cover defence equipment and industry costs (Handford & Gee, 2023).

Changes in the increasingly complex international strategic and political environment both traditionally and non-traditionally encourage countries to adapt and strengthen themselves carefully, including Indonesia. Although Indonesia still faces various security threats, it is not necessarily in open war, similar to the majority of post-Cold War countries. It is important to note that after the end of the Cold War, there was a transformation of military functions in different countries. The military, which initially served as a combat/war force, began to move into different roles focused on maintaining peace, resolving conflicts, and assisting civilian political authorities in dealing with domestic crises (Hugh, 2005). The term is also known as military operations other than war (OMSP) or two alternatives: Operation Support Peace (OMP) or Peace Support Operation (PSO) (Darwanto, 2015).

In recent decades, due to the increasing complexity of state security challenges and threats both externally and internally as previously discussed, there has been a positive trend towards the implementation of OMSP or noncombat military operations as a military strategy of various countries in maintaining stability and security. China, for example, is one of the Big Power countries that launched this strategy, they realized that to prepare for war resistance in the era of information technology, modernization and reform of the country's military structure are needed. Therefore, the Chinese armed forces have begun to emphasize

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the importance of conducting various non-war operations (feizhanzheng junshi xingdong) or military use for specific purposes.

Essentially, in international security studies, experts widely believe that countries will use the resources at their disposal to enhance and generate conventional military capabilities and skills to carry out traditional combatant missions primarily against other nations in war. Most rising powers in the past have shown conformity with the arguments of this theory, the United States, for example, developed the doctrine of "military operations other than war" after the collapse of the Soviet Union not only to address security threats outside of war but also to enhance the military capabilities of the United States armed forces (Fravel, 2011).

CSOs include various efforts such as maintaining, enforcing, and maintaining peaceful situations. Not only that, the duties of the OMSP also include activities to supervise the arms trade. Although it does not involve the use or threat of violence, CSOs focus more on providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Before carrying out operations, assigned units conduct situation and condition recognition to determine the required strengths and expertise, plan actions, train personnel, and prepare preconditions to achieve operational objectives. Special teams for terrain recognition can be formed to make quick observations, identify threats, communicate with various parties, and so on (Darwanto, 2015).

Today, CSOs are transformed into political tasks whose success is immeasurable, not only that, it is difficult to determine where and under what circumstances soldiers are assigned to carry out CSOs and when an OMSP is considered complete. OMSP missions require somewhat different skills compared to non-OMP missions, this is because OMSP missions on many occasions have unique challenges, for example, natural disasters in various regions require different operating techniques, such as erupting mountains, floods, forest fires, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, and others. It does not stop there, when facing acts of terrorism and separatism, actions that require countermeasures also vary. Although CSOs are considered as valuable a task as war assignments, war operations (against state or non-state actors) should be a priority if necessary.

The army must maintain focus on its main mission, which is war against other countries if the situation compels. However, if the OMSP can achieve the same goals effectively, military operations of war must be considered. This is because CSOs generally have lower risks to soldiers and countries compared to wartime military operations (Darwanto, 2015).

In practice, in running CSOs, military groups cooperate with relevant institutions or organizations, especially those related to diplomacy, government, economics, and political and religious aspects, including with intelligence agencies. However, in this article, the author argues that it is important for Indonesia as one of the rising powers in Asia, to build the Defence Intelligence Agency as an institutional instrument of special attention to increase Indonesia's defence capacity and capability, especially in carrying out noncombat military missions.

According to the authors, the establishment of a specialized intelligence agency within a country's military institutions is very important for several compelling reasons, especially when it comes to non-military operations because: (1) the agency has the potential to play an important role in maintaining national security by collecting and analyzing information related to potential threats of its nature complex; (2) defence intelligence agencies will enhance a country's ability to respond effectively to crises and emergencies; (3) This institution together with military institutions can play an important role in assisting the country in supporting diplomatic efforts and strategic decision-making. Through this article, the author will discuss the importance of the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency as an implementation of non-combat military missions, sequence, this article will be divided into four parts, namely: (1) background, which we have gone through; (2) research methods; (3) discussions that will focus on discussions on the importance of the Defence Intelligence Agency in Non-Combat Military Missions; (4) policy conclusions and suggestions.

Research Method

This study used qualitative approaches and literature review methods to investigate the important role of intelligence agencies in non-combatant military missions. The qualitative nature of the study allows for an in-depth exploration of various aspects related to intelligence operations in the context of non-combatant missions. The literature review method involves a systematic examination of relevant scholarly articles, reports, official documents, and publications spanning the last two decades (2004-2024), focusing on themes such as intelligence strategy, information-gathering techniques, decision-making processes, and the impact of intelligence support on mission success. Data analysis includes qualitative content analysis techniques to identify patterns, themes, and key insights emerging from the synthesized literature. By adopting a qualitative approach with literature review methods, this study aims to provide valuable insights into the practice and role of military intelligence in operational planning and strategic decision-making in non-combatant military missions.

Result and Discussion

Why Defence Intelligence Agencies Are Important to Non-Combat Military Missions

The importance of intelligence agencies to military operations is not a new topic of discussion and has been a topic of discussion for centuries. Sun Tzu is one of the philosophers who teaches the concept of defence intelligence philosophy by emphasizing the crucial superiority of information before engaging in warfare. Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of having sufficient knowledge of one's own and the enemy's abilities. According to Sun Tzu, having sufficient knowledge of both sides allowed the warring sides to engage in various battles without risking defeat. Conversely, a lack of information about the enemy despite understanding one's abilities results in equal chances of winning and losing. Complete

ignorance of information about both sides on the other side guarantees defeat in every battle (Kartomo, Legionosuko, & Risman, 2022). Sun Tzu, also highlighted the importance of intelligence as a tool in shaping decisions and policies in the country's defence management. Understanding information about adversaries and existing threats is closely related to understanding the strategic environment. Information in a strategic context is key to anticipating the development of future security threats. This aspect has an important meaning in shaping various policy formulations in the field of defence and state security (Arief, Widjayanto, & Priyanto, 2021).

Before discussing the urgency of establishing a Defence Intelligence Agency, it is important to understand the concept of Military Intelligence, Defence Policy and Defence Diplomacy and the links between them. The concept of Military Intelligence has become a very important concept because lately, governments in various parts of the world rely a lot on intelligence to support their military power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This is happening in many different regions with different missions both for foreign and domestic missions, as well as in a variety of contexts, including counterterrorism, homeland security, peace operations and regional stability efforts (Rietjens & De Werd, 2023).

Military intelligence It can be understood as the systematic process of collecting, managing, analyzing, and disseminating supporting information, which may or may not have been identified by decision-makers, to support a country's military interests in particular to maintain security (Oliveira et al., 2008). According to Serra, in a military context, the process of targeting Military Intelligence starts at the political level by identifying the goals of the state and the obstacles posed by any other state, power, or political actor that competes with or opposes the interests of that country. Once identified, the opposing party's activities, mindset, motives, power systems, and combat capabilities are then analyzed. Therefore, the target Military Intelligence is any actual or potential military threat to a political unit of the state. Gomez noted that the goal of Military Intelligence is to support political decision-makers in achieving the ultimate goal of a state, which is to prevent war, and, if necessary and if all other options have been exhausted, to provide military capabilities with which to defend itself and national sovereignty. Andriole on the other hand added that Military Intelligence focusing on all aspects of a country's military power in both wartime and peacetime is designed to encourage strengthening of military capabilities (Oliveira et al., 2008). In a shorter definition, Military Intelligence can be summed up as the process of data collection and knowledge analysis for decision-making by military and government hierarchies to achieve three objectives: (a) evaluation of the capabilities and motives of the opposing party; (b) enhance military capabilities by increasing the effectiveness of weapons systems and reducing the effectiveness of opposing weapon systems; and (c) intelligence superiority results in an advantage over its competitors, particularly in terms of deterrence (Pecht & Tishler, 2017).

Next, the definition of defence policy is closely related to the concept of policy. Policy can be defined as (1) A particular direction or method of action chosen from a variety of alternatives and taking into account certain conditions to guide and determine current and future decision-making; (2) A high-level overall plan designed to achieve specific objectives through procedures approved in particular by government agencies/agencies. Departing from this understanding, defence policy can be interpreted as a set of actions or practices, as defined by senior executive leadership, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions and other matters related to the administration of military affairs, which are consistent and aligned with the country's security strategy.

In line with the previous second definition of policy, defence policy can also be defined as "a program to defend a country from its enemies," whereas programs can be understood as "a system of projects or services intended to meet public needs." The two definitions given above do not contradict each other; On the contrary, the two complement each other. A good starting point in a discussion of defence policy is to make it clear that the term defence policy encompasses two aspects—namely, what needs to be achieved—and the means and means—of how and with what resources the goal is to be achieved.

In short, in the implementation of defence policy two different tasks must be carried out: (1) the first task is about how to use existing resources to achieve objectives, for example when a security threat occurs; (2) determine how to achieve these objectives so that the threat can be effectively addressed and prevented from reoccurring in the future (Pecht & Tishler, 2017). In practice, a good defence policy includes a good security strategy, namely a security strategy that provides a concept of using diplomacy, economy, military, and other instruments of power that are clear, realistic, and effective to achieve a country's security goals.

Depending on an assessment of security risks and threats, traditional strengths and weaknesses of adversaries, and identified opportunities—along with an assessment of one's and adversary's vulnerabilities—security strategies can help project the various armed forces that should play a role in using among specific instruments of power (Pecht & Tishler, 2017), diplomacy for example. In designing a Defence Policy, like public policy, there are five stages of policy formulation, namely: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. In line with the policy formulation process, the policy analysis process is also carried out and goes through five stages, namely: problem formulation, forecasting, recommendations, monitoring, and evaluation.

The policy formulation process which is a political process is therefore carried out by political actors, while the policy analysis process is the process of an expert policy maker. The highest products of Defence Policy are national laws or laws in the field of defence, Government Regulations, Presidential Regulations, Presidential Decrees, Regulations of the Minister of Defence, and Decrees of the Minister of Defence. In Indonesia, to handle the task of formulating laws and regulations, the Ministry of Defence has four directorates general.

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The four directorates general are defence strategy, defence planning, defence strength, and defence potential. The Directorate General is the initiating unit that formulates the defence policy (Agus Rohmat Hidayat, Alifah, Rodiansjah, & Asikin, 2024).

Next, is defence diplomacy. The origin of the term "defence diplomacy" is closely related to the changing understanding of international security and national security policy post-Cold War. The argument for the demilitarization of international relations is, on the one hand, the underlying issue, while on the other, broader perceptions of the role of the armed forces, which go beyond their offensive, defensive or deterrence roles, also contributed to the birth of this concept. In Britain, since the end of the 20th century, military force guarantees the achievement of short-term military goals, or "winning battles".

However, this approach shows many shortcomings as a long-term policy tool. After the end of the Cold War, the role of the military was considered to have to be expanded to ensure peace, using various instruments related to the operation of the army, its command structure, or civilian political factors that could oversee it. It is also related to the prospect of strengthening the role of the military in diplomacy and its specialization as a mechanism for the prevention of international threats and the establishment of international security. Within this framework, defence diplomacy is seen as an effective crisis prevention instrument (Drab, 2018).

British political scientists Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster believe that the definition of defence diplomacy is closely related to military diplomacy. Military diplomacy can be understood as a specific set of tasks performed only by military representatives, defence attaches, or other military representatives in carrying out missions and peace operations and for international military cooperation. However, Defence diplomacy is a broader concept than military diplomacy because it covers the objectives and tasks of military diplomacy, but also includes issues related to building trust, preventing crises and conflict resolution, defence dialogue, developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation (in international organizations), and also relating to the use of armed forces in international missions and operations.

Therefore defence diplomacy can be described as a practice of conducting negotiations, which requires the use of means, methods and instruments that do not escalate hostilities and, at the same time, are implemented based on international law. The main task of defence diplomacy is to establish military relations between countries. Contemporary defence diplomacy is undergoing continuous adaptive evolution to changing conditions of military operations and expanding the scope of its meaning (Drab, 2018).

The relationship between Military Intelligence, Defence Policy, and Defence Diplomacy can be understood as fundamental things that make up a country's comprehensive security framework, and play an important role in shaping a country's security posture on the global stage. Military Intelligence is closely related to defence policy because it serves as a fundamental decision-making framework in national defence policy. This is because the

systematic collection, dissemination, and analysis of intelligence is integral for countries to anticipate and counter potential threats. Informed defence policy relies heavily on the insights provided by military intelligence, to ensure that strategic decision-making is rooted in a comprehensive understanding and information of the actual security environment.

One important aspect of the interaction between Military Intelligence and Defence Policy is closely related to the role of military intelligence in conducting threat assessment. Intelligence groups are capable of gathering and processing information about potential adversaries, their capabilities, and intentions. This information provides a foundation for defence policymakers, enabling them to formulate strategies capable of effectively addressing perceived threats. For example, if military intelligence indicates a potential change in the geopolitical landscape or identifies emerging new security challenges, defence policy can be tailored to safeguard national security interests.

The symbiotic relationship between Military Intelligence and Defence Policy drives dynamic and adaptive responses to evolving global security dynamics. Military Intelligence contributes significantly to defence policy by facilitating force planning and resource allocation. Understanding the capabilities of a potential adversary allows defence planners to tailor military forces to specific threats. This targeted approach ensures more efficient use of resources, optimizing the military's ability to respond to diverse challenges. Therefore, the role of military intelligence in shaping defence policy not only includes threat assessment but also includes strategic positioning and capability development necessary to maintain a credible and effective defence posture (Drab, 2018).

In the field of defence diplomacy, Military Intelligence is emerging as a fundamental contributing factor. In executing defence strategies, diplomats rely on accurate and timely intelligence to navigate complex international relations. By basing on intelligence insights, defence diplomats can engage with foreign parties more effectively, thus contributing to the building of long-term strategic partnerships and alliances. The synergy between Military Intelligence and defence diplomacy can also be translated into collaborative actions to address shared security issues.

Sharing intelligence among countries with shared interests, for example, to prevent terrorism, enhance collective situational awareness and encourage cooperative responses to shared threats, thus strengthening the overall security architecture. Defence diplomacy, in turn, provides diplomatic pathways for intelligence information to resolve conflicts and crisis management. Military Intelligence, through its role in identifying points of contention or areas of common interest, enhances the diplomatic tools available to a country. The integration of intelligence into defence diplomacy underscores the holistic approach needed to address security challenges, recognizing the interconnectedness of military and diplomatic strategies (Drab, 2018).

Based on the previous discussion, it can be concluded that Military Intelligence has a strategic role in the formation of defence policy and execution of defence diplomacy,

therefore the author believes that the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency under the Minister of Defence is one of the policies that can have a lot of positive impacts.

Currently, Indonesia has several sources of defence and security intelligence information, such intelligence information can be sourced from the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), as well as the State Cyber and Encryption Agency (BSSN). However, the author argues that the existence of the Defence Intelligence Agency within the Defence Ministry has several advantages to several aspects including:

1. **Coordination and Integration:** Placing intelligence agencies within the defence ministry can facilitate better coordination and integration between intelligence and military operations. This close connectedness enables smooth communication and collaboration between intelligence analysts and policymakers at the Ministry of Defence.
2. **Real-time Decision Making:** The direct linkage between intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence enables faster decision-making in response to emerging threats.
3. **Granting Security and Trust Clearances:** The integration of intelligence agencies into the defence ministry often means that intelligence personnel already have the necessary security clearances. This can increase trust and smooth the flow of confidential information, as there is already a framework in place to deal with sensitive data within the broader defence ministry structure.
4. **Effective Resource Allocation:** Having an intelligence agency within the defence ministry can facilitate a more effective allocation of resources. This allows for a direct connection between intelligence needs and military capabilities, ensuring that resources are prioritized based on the needs of the armed forces.
5. **Unity of Vision:** An organizational structure that together can contribute to a unified strategic vision in which intelligence and military elements work together seamlessly. This unity of purpose can improve the overall effectiveness of national security efforts.

Although the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency would certainly be beneficial to the framework of the country's security strategy and planning in dealing with any threat both traditional and non-traditional, in line with post-Cold War security trends, given the increasing diversity of new security threats and increasing military operations other than war, it will be highly relevant in supporting the Non-Combat Military Mission, This is because Indonesia's contemporary security is haunted by many non-military threats and because of the advantages of the existence of the institution itself.

Mardhani et al in their article noted that threats in Indonesia include intolerance (SARA), terrorism, procedural democracy, inequality of bureaucratic reform, high levels of corruption, and inadequate law enforcement (Mardhani, 2020). The threat of intolerance can

be seen in the widespread rejection of leaders of different beliefs by 58.4%. Indonesia's democracy index still has procedural gaps that can be seen from the gap in civil liberties (78.75%), political rights (72.49%), and mass demonstrations that ended in violence (29.22%) in 2015-2017. In addition, the problem of separatism still haunts Indonesia, especially in Papua. The separatism incident that occurred in Papua is not much different from other conflict-prone areas.

According to Decky Wospakrik, the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is not satisfied with the policies taken by the Indonesian government as long as Papua remains Indonesia's property. The OPM resistance aimed to break away from the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI). The continuation of OPM resistance and struggle occurred in various regions in Papua which occurred from 1967 to 2001. Then followed by a series of shootings in mountainous areas that deliberately disrupted security stability in Papua, they were called the Armed Criminal Group (KKB). Abroad, the dynamics of Indonesia's future defence threats are demonstrated by the rapid growth of weapons and the increasing threat of unconventional warfare (Mardhani, 2020). Finally, Indonesia is also quite prone to disasters because of its geographical position. Therefore, the existence of the Defence Intelligence Agency in the Ministry of Defence can assist military groups in navigating non-combatant missions to deal with the security issues and challenges described earlier.

The authors identify at least three main benefits of the existence of an Intelligence Agency for Non-Combat Military Missions that arise as a positive consequence of the existence of intelligence information, three benefits related to the valuation effect, the operational effect, and the relative effect. First, when policymakers plan their national budgets and military capabilities based on their evaluation of potential, capabilities, and possible threats, it allows for large margins of confidence. Comprehensive and better Intelligence information can reduce the level of uncertainty in assessing potential tactical and strategic threats and threat carrier intent, enabling the creation of comprehensive solutions. More accurate knowledge of counterparties' capabilities and intentions will most likely result in more efficient state planning and capacity-building processes and, thus, result in higher levels of security.

While each country knows threat source capabilities, this knowledge is limited and, typically, contains such great uncertainty that decision-makers must be prepared for drafting, or even many, operating strategy configurations. Therefore, the value of intelligence to policymakers depends on two things: (a) the level of uncertainty that decision-makers want to face (decision-making conservatism), and (b) the efficiency of the intelligence process (denoted by intelligence efficiency). These two attributes influence the country's perception of its opponent's level of ability, resulting in an evaluation effect (Pecht & Tishler, 2017).

Next, the intelligence collected and analyzed will enhance a country's military operating capabilities by increasing the effectiveness of its strategy system and reducing the effectiveness of the opponent's defence system. For example, counterterrorism operations are

much more efficient when intelligence is accurate and up-to-date on the group. Finally, more knowledge of the opponent's intentions, conditions, and operations can lead to the implementation of systems and handling procedures that can contain the opponent even with no combat activity at all, thus, achieving significant advantages, this is referred to as the operational effect. Lastly, having an intelligence advantage over opponents has its direct advantage. Investments made by the state in the field of intelligence, by establishing a Defence Intelligence Agency in the Ministry for example, relative to its opponent can significantly affect the opponent's perception of the extent of the opponent's strategy to deterrence. This is called the relative effect (Pecht & Tishler, 2017).

Not only that, the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency will also help a lot of Indonesia's defence diplomacy. This is because Intelligence plays an important role in defence diplomacy. The existence of the Defence Intelligence Agency will help Diplomats obtain accurate and actual intelligence information in real-time, hence it will be very useful to become a foundation for effective and meaningful Indonesian decision-making, strategic planning, and engagement on the global security stage. More specifically, the Defence Intelligence Agency can play an important role in supporting non-combat military operations in the field of defence diplomacy, particularly by synergizing with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in addressing global, regional, or even bilateral security issues. In non-combat operations, where military activity may be focused on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or capacity building, accurate intelligence support helps ensure that diplomatic initiatives based on accurate and targeted information are objectively appropriate to address specific security challenges faced in the region.

In addition, intelligence support by the Defence Intelligence Agency also has the potential to play an important role for diplomats to conduct risk assessment and threat analysis, which will ultimately affect the success of non-combat military operations. By understanding local dynamics, potential security threats, and the socio-political landscape, defence diplomats can tailor their engagement strategies to effectively address challenges unique to a region, particularly in amplifying the effects of deterrence.

Finally, the existence of the Defence Intelligence Agency allows collaboration and synchronization between a country's intelligence agency and the local defence industry which is essentially essential for the holistic advancement of national security. This collaboration ensures that the Defence Intelligence Agency and the defence industry work together, sharing important information and insights. By aligning intelligence priorities with defence industry capabilities, Indonesia can strategically invest in research, development, and production, fostering innovation and adaptability. These synergies enable the defence industry to develop cutting-edge technologies and solutions tailored to address specific threats identified by intelligence agencies. Real-time information exchange enables rapid response to emerging security challenges, ensuring that the military remains well-equipped and operationally effective.

In addition, this collaboration stimulates economic growth by providing a clear direction for the defence sector, contributing to national security and industrial development. The interconnected relationship between defence intelligence agencies and the local defence industry ultimately strengthens a country's overall defence capabilities and resilience in the face of evolving threats.

This collaboration is in line with the mandate of Indonesian President Joko Widodo whose mission will be continued by Indonesian Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto who previously served as Minister of Defence. Previously, President Joko Widodo mandated Deputy Defence Minister Sakti Wahyu Trenggono to develop a strategic domestic defence industry and also provide support to Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto. Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto stated that to advance the domestic weapon system industry, cooperation must be held between state and private companies following Law Number 16 of 2012 concerning the Defence Industry (article 11) which stipulates that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are the best industries that produce major equipment industries, and private-owned companies must support the defence industry by providing raw materials (Mardhani, 2020), therefore the author suggests building cooperation with PT. PINDAD is a local defence industry which is a state-owned enterprise.

In the end, the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency is in line with the vision & mission of Indonesia Emas 2045 to improve national strategic industrial capabilities, strengthen the concept of defence posture, strengthen synergies between defence instruments, and utilize domestic strategic industries (Hatta, 2020).

Conclusions

It can be concluded that Military Intelligence has an important role in defence policy-making, especially in providing the information needed to anticipate and deal with potential threats. Military Intelligence enables comprehensive and up-to-date threat assessment, allowing policymakers to formulate effective Defence Policy. In the context of Defence Diplomacy, Military Intelligence supports defence diplomacy by providing accurate intelligence information. This collaboration enables defence diplomats to interact with foreign parties effectively, build partnerships, and address shared security challenges. Departing from this background, the author concludes that the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency under the Minister of Defence is a policy that needs to be carried out because it has the potential to have a major positive impact on Indonesia's security landscape in the future. This is because the agency can coordinate intelligence with military operations, enable faster decision-making, and trim workflows and necessary security clearances. More importantly, the Defence Intelligence Agency is capable of supporting non-combat military mission operations by providing intelligence for strategic and operational planning. The author believes that the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency can also strengthen Indonesia's defence diplomacy. This is because the agency can assist defence diplomats in

obtaining accurate intelligence for decision-making and strategic planning. Finally, not only that, the Defence Intelligence Agency can also foster meaningful collaboration with the local defence industry as a strategic step to enhance national defence capabilities and support economic growth. Overall, the Defence Intelligence Agency is considered an important element in improving coordination, decision-making, and collaboration at home and abroad, thus contributing significantly to Indonesia's national security. Even so, the author believes that the intelligence function carried out by the Defence Intelligence Agency must be able to synergize and synchronize with the intelligence community that already exists in Indonesia, so it is hoped that Indonesia's mission to become an Asian Tiger can be realized.

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Advances in Social Humanities Research

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